Zahid Reza | 14 August 2026 | Maktoob
Somewhere in Uttar Pradesh this month, a young man who has spent the better part of a year studying toward a Fazil degree is discovering that the qualification does not, in the eyes of the law, exist anymore. He enrolled expecting to graduate with what the state's own Madarsa Board had certified for decades as a postgraduate qualification proof, on paper, that years of Arabic literature, Islamic jurisprudence, logic and theology had earned him something the system would recognise. He did not choose to become a case study in the architecture of Indian federalism. But somewhere in the space between a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court and a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court, that is exactly what he became one of tens of thousands of students whose futures now hinge on a constitutional argument most of them will never read in full.
This is not, at bottom, a story about whether madrasas should exist. No court has said so, and no serious political voice has argued it either. The question that has actually occupied India's judiciary for the past two years is narrower, and considerably harder: when the state sets out to bring a minority community's centuries-old educational pathway into line with national standards, where does legitimate regulation end and the quiet dismantling of that pathway begin? The Supreme Court's answer, delivered on 5 November 2024 in Anjum Kadari v. Union of India, was more measured than the headlines on either side suggested at the time. What has happened since is a reminder that a careful judgment and a well-executed reform are not the same thing.
To understand what was actually at stake, it helps to see what the Uttar Pradesh Board of Madarsa Education Act, 2004 was built to do. It did not invent madrasas, which have operated in the state for well over a century. It tried to standardise them creating a statutory Board with the power to recognise institutions, prescribe curricula and conduct examinations across a ladder of qualifications that climbs from Tahtania and Fauqania at the primary level, through Munshi and Maulvi at roughly the Class 10 mark, to Alim at roughly Class 12, and finally to Kamil and Fazil. The Board's own 2016 regulations left no ambiguity about how it treated these last two: Kamil was defined, in so many words, as an undergraduate degree of the Board, and Fazil as its postgraduate degree. Those same regulations, notably, required Arabic and Persian madrasas to teach mathematics, history, geography and science alongside Arabic, Urdu, Hadees and theology a fact that lawyers for the madrasa associations would later insist the Allahabad High Court had simply failed to register.
The High Court's judgment, delivered on 22 March 2024 by a Division Bench of Justices Vivek Chaudhary and Subhash Vidyarthi, did not stop at reforming any of this. It held that the Madarsa Act violated secularism as an element of the Constitution's basic structure, infringed Articles 14, 15 and 21-A, and could not survive in any form. The state was directed to absorb every madrasa student into the ordinary school system, and to do so without delay. It is worth pausing on what that actually meant in practice: a court, ruling on a single writ petition brought by one individual, ordering the effective dissolution of an educational system serving well over a million children, on a compressed timetable, with no worked-out plan for where those children would go.

